Showing posts with label Fairfax. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Fairfax. Show all posts

Saturday, April 12, 2014

Fairfax and Base Effect


In the previous post, we had spoken about 5, 10 and 15 year record of Fairfax.

So, why do we hold Fairfax?

a. Since 2008, Fairfax has publically had a different equity strategy compared to Berkshire and Markel.

b. If we consider 2009 to 2013 as base effect issues because they have taken a fairly different strategy as against the market.

c. Let us look at 1998 to 2008 and 2003 to 2008 and 2008:

Fairfax

1998 to 2008 9.3%
2003 to 2008 10.9%

Berkshire

1998 to 2008 6.4%
2003 to 2008 6.9%

Markel

1998 to 2008 11.2%
2003 to 2008 9.6%

Fairfax and Thomas Cook

When Fairfax financial invested into Thomas Cook, every Tom, Dick and Harry went out and bought Thomas Cook in India as they thought they were buying into the 'Warren Buffett of Canada'. The 20% compounder, value investor supreme.

So, we decided to look at Fairfax financials - the actual parent company - and look at their performance versus Berkshire and Markel and see how the numbers stack up. The table below explains itself.

While this is not representative of what Thomas Cook will do, one must look carefully at how Prem has performed in the last 10 to 15 years. Please note that the annual change is Book Value change, there is no point in tracking the stock performance.

If you take out the first few years of Fairfax, it is a very different story.

FairFax Financials
100 $ Invested
Annual Change
100
1998
130.0
30
1999
179.4
38
2000
170.4
-5
2001
134.6
-21
2002
144.1
7
2003
188.7
31
2004
186.8
-1
2005
156.9
-16
2006
171.1
9
2007
261.7
53
2008
316.7
21
2009
421.2
33
2010
429.6
2
2011
416.7
-3
2012
433.4
4
2013
390.1
-10
1998 to 2013
9.5%
2003 to 2013
7.5%
2008 to 2013
4.3%
Berkshire Hathaway 100 $ Invested Annual Change
100
1998 148.3 48.3
1999 149.0 0.5
2000 158.7 6.5
2001 148.9 -6.2
2002 163.8 10
2003 198.2 21
2004 219.0 10.5
2005 233.0 6.4
2006 275.9 18.4
2007 306.2 11
2008 276.8 -9.6
2009 331.6 19.8
2010 374.7 13
2011 392.0 4.6
2012 448.4 14.4
2013 530.0 18.2
1998 to 2013 11.8%
2003 to 2013 10.3%
2008 to 2013 13.9%
Markel
100 $ Invested
Annual Change
100
1998
118.4
18.4
1999
105.2
-11.2
2000
157.5
49.7
2001
169.5
7.7
2002
180.9
6.7
2003
215.4
19.1
2004
258.1
19.8
2005
267.0
3.4
2006
352.6
32.1
2007
407.0
15.4
2008
340.9
-16.2
2009
433.6
27.2
2010
500.8
15.5
2011
540.2
7.9
2012
619.7
14.7
2013
732.1
18.1
1998 to 2013
14.2%
2003 to 2013
13.0%
2008 to 2013
16.5%



Disclosure: Long Fairfax for a very strange reason and a small portion of the portfolio. No position in Thomas Cook

Monday, March 31, 2014

Correlation and Concentration!!!

Beware of the contents in this post!!!!

One of the cardinal rules in investing has been diversification to prevent concentration and correlation of risk!! Currently, I am in serious violation of the rule in a significant portion of the US portfolio on the rule and I am NOT losing any sleep over it.

Will my volatility be higher? The answer is yes. Will there be significantly higher volatility than the rest of the market? The answer is absolutely yes.

But in my book, volatility and risk are not the same. My correlation and concentration are between companies that I consider Fort Knox's of the world and while we may a terrible year because the all the stocks in the sector might go down in a particular year, we are not worried.

Our position derives from our significant exposure to the insurance businesses in the US. A significant piece of our US portfolio rests with four US insurers -- Berkshire Hathaway, Fairfax financials, Markel and AIG.

We expect all these companies to exist 25 years from now playing with their services still being required in the economy. While there might be a year or two, where due to natural catastrophes or bad year in the stock market or regulatory headwinds, we might see a significantly bad years but overall we do not intend to sell any of these four anytime in the near future and are willing to ride through volatility.

We were lucky to buy the companies that were well in discount to their intrinsic value. We bought Berkshire on two occasions when WEB gave a singing endorsement by buying back stock. (We are happy to buy with the same terms as WEB though his cost of capital is lower) We bought Markel at book value right after the Alterra acquisition and Fairfax at discount to book value a couple of years ago. AIG was acquired at 0.5 times book. All were purchased with a margin of safety and run by top capital allocators who will do a tremendous job in a downturn in deploying cash,

We are very comfortable with the management all these four companies and expect them to do very well over the course of the next ten years.